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REGULATING THE ACCESS OF CHILDREN TO 
TELEVISED VIOLENCE 
Kevin W. Saunders· 
2002 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 813 
I would like to begin by thanking the organizers of this symposium for 
stretching the concept of access to include limitations on audience access, 
both of children to material that may be inappropriate and of broadcasters to 
audiences that include children. It is an important issue and one on which 
fonner FCC Commissioner Quello was one of the early voices of concern. In 
the early 1990s, Chainnan Quello suggested that the FCC's approach to the 
regulation of indecent material on the broadcast media be extended to include 
depictions of violence. 1 A more recent champion of that approach has been 
Commissioner Gloria Tristani.2 
On the legislative side, perhaps the strongest proponent of restrictions 
has been Senator Ernest Hollings. Over the years, he has introduced a series 
of bills intended to bring broadcast violence under FCC control. It is the latest 
of those bills that I will use as the focus of this talk. Senate Bill 341 (bill), 
introduced on February 15,2001, but stalled along with much of the rest of the 
Nation's legislative business by the attacks on September 11th, may well 
never see action by this Congress.3 It is, however, so likely to be followed by 
similar efforts that an examination of its provisions and constitutionality is 
worthwhile. 
The bill, titled the Children's Protection from Violent Programming 
Act, 4 grows out of dissatisfaction with the V -chip based approach to parental 
control. Studies indicate that the V -chip is having limited success,s and while 
it might be tempting to attribute that limited success to lack of parental 
interest, it may be that the industry's choices were intended to, or at least had 
the effect of, limiting efficacy. Dale Kunkel pointed out early in the process 
• Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. AB., Franklin 
and Marshall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan. 
1. See, e.g., James H. Quello, Big Brother Is Watching You, But Are the Kids, 
Remarks Before the 23rd Annual INTV Convention (Jan. 21, 1996), at 
http://www.fcc.gov/SpeecheslQuello/spjhq601.txt. 
2. See Gloria Tristani, On Children and Television, Keynote Address at the Annenberg 
Public Policy Center's 5th Annual Conference on Children & Media (June 26, 2000), at 
http://www.fcc.gov/SpeecheslTristanil2000/spgt009.txt. 
3. See S. 341, 107th Congo (2001). 
4. See id. A parallel bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 
1005, 107th Congo (2001). 
5. See, e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation, Parents and the V-Chip, 2001, at 
http://www.kff.orglcontentl200 l/3158/chartpack. pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). 
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of developing the V -chip system that an age-based, rather than a content-
based, system was unlikely to work.6 Not allowing parents to make choices 
based on the violent nature of the material, but instead requiring that all 
material that might be seen as inappropriate for particular age groups, 
functionally undercuts the goals of the V -chip requirements.7 Parents who 
would have blocked all violence would not block all material not suitable for 
a twelve year 01d.8 
The new bill requires the FCC to assess the effectiveness of the ratings 
and encodings that make parents' use of the V-chip possible.9 If the 
Commission finds the V -chip measures insufficiently effective, the 
Commission is required to engage in rulemaking to prohibit violent video 
programming during hours when children are likely to be a substantial 
proportion of the audience. 10 Since the bill requires effectiveness to be judged 
on the ability to block based solely on violent content and the accompanying 
findings indicate that aged-based ratings lack that ability, it is clearly 
envisioned that such rulemaking will prove necessary. In that process the 
FCC is also directed to determine the hours in which violent programming 
would be limited and to develop a defmition of ''violent video 
programming."" Significantly, the prohibition would apply not only to 
broadcast television but to cable as well, although premium and pay-per-view 
programming would be exempt. 12 
The bill, should it or a future similar effort become law, would operate 
against a background of FCC efforts to limit the broadcast of indecent 
material. The seminal case in the area is FCCv. Pacifica Foundation, 13 which 
grew out of the afternoon radio broadcast of satirist/humorist George Carlin's 
"Filthy Words" monologue by a New York radio station. After receiving a 
complaint from a listener claiming he and his young son had heard the 
broadcast, the Commission associated the complaint with the station's file to 
be considered should further complaints be received. 14 The Commission also 
determined that the material in question, despite Carlin's assertions that the 
6. See Dale Kunkel, Why Content, Not the Age of Viewers, Should Control What 
Children Watch on TV, CHRON. OFHIGHEREDUC., Ian. 31,1997, at B4. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See S. 341, 107th Congo § 3(a)(I) (2001). 
10. See id. at § 3(b). 
11. [d. at § 4. 
12. See id. 
13. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
14. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,730 (1978). 
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words could never be said over the air, could be said but only during hours at 
which children were not likely to be in the audience. 15 
The Supreme Court had to consider both statutory and constitutional 
issues. On the statutory side, the Court concluded that federal law prohibiting 
the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language" in any radio 
transmission provided such authority.16 On the constitutional side, the Court 
noted that the broadcast media enjoy less fIrst amendment protection than 
other media, because of a number offactors. 17 Among them are the pervasive 
presence of the broadcast media in our lives. The broadcast of indecent 
material confronts us not only in public but also in our homes, including 
accessibility of broadcasts to children, even those too young to read. 18 
Warnings were also seen as inadequate for those tuning in after the program 
had begun, and turning off the broadcast after hearing the indecent language 
was seen as an inadequate remedy. 19 Only channeling in hours when children 
were unlikely to be listening seemed effective in protecting children from the 
. broadcast of indecency. 20 
Given this background, the current efforts to treat violence similarly 
raises at least two signifIcant issues. First, can the approach taken with sexual 
indecency be extended to include limitations on violent programming in 
broadcast television? Second, even if the subject matter subjected to 
channeling can include violence, can the channeling requirements be imposed 
on cable programming in addition to broadcast television? 
Turning to the fIrst issue, the language of the statute under which the 
regulation in Pacifica took place may be broad enough to include violence. 
The Pacifica Court's interpretation of the term "indecent" in the statutory 
prohibition was that it did not mean "obscene" but addressed material not in 
conformance with "accepted standards of morality.,,21 Given that broad 
reading, it would seem that violent material not conforming with accepted 
standards of morality could be barred under the statute. If not, any 
interpretive difficulty would be cured by a statute such as that proposed. 
There is, however, a more difficult issue as to whether the Pacifica 
Court's holding, that the regulation of indecency is constitutional, carries over 
15. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32. 
16. Id. at 731 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976». 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 748-49. 
20. See id. at 748-50. 
21. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740 (citing WEBSTER'sTHIRDNEW!NT'LDICTIONARY(1966), 
which defines "indecent" as "altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or 
what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable: 
UNSEEMLY ... not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality."). 
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to violent material. In an article published shortly after Pacifica, Professors 
Krattenmaker and Powe concluded that any attempt to regulate broadcast 
violence would still raise first amendment problems.22 They examined the 
holding against a background of other Supreme Court cases concerning the 
first amendment rights of children and concluded that, unless the Court was 
implicitly overruling several of those decisions, the indecency that the FCC 
had the right to regulate had to be conceptually related to obscenity.23 That is, 
the material subject to channeling must have the character of obscene material 
without necessarily reaching such a level of explicitness and offensiveness as 
to be legally obscene.24 Pacifica is then, in their view, limited to sexually 
indecent material. 
The focus of much of my work and the relevance of that work to the 
issue here has been to propose a theory that responds to Krattenmaker and 
Powe's argument. 2S Accepting their rather well argued position that indecency 
must be related to obscenity, my response has been to argue that sufficiently 
explicit and offensive depictions of violence can be included in a statute 
addressing obscenity. If that is the case, then less extreme depictions can be 
considered indecent for purposes of channeling in broadcast television. 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never directly ruled 
that violent material cannot be obscene or at least regulatable. While there is 
language in cases involving sexual material that indicates that such material 
must be erotic to be obscene, in those cases the Court was considering 
distinctions among materials with a focus on sex or words often associated 
with sex and concluded that such sexual themes must be erotic to be 
obscene.26 The relevance of these cases to violence may be minimal. The 
only Supreme Court case directly concerning the regulation of violence was 
Winters v. New York.27 While the Court struck down the statute at issue, it did 
so on vagueness grounds and warned against the inference that violent 
material could not be regulated under a properly drawn statute.28 
22. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First 
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123 (1978). 
23. See id. at 1279-88. 
24. See id. 
25. See generally KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENlTY: LIMITING 1HE 
MEDIA'S FIRsT AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1996). See also Kevin W. Saunders, Media Self-
Regulation o/Depictions o/Violence: A Last Opportunity, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 445 (1994); Kevin 
W. Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment, 3 WM. & 
MAR,yBILL RTS. J. 107 (1994). 
26. See. e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Ermomik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.IO (1975). 
27. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
28. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948). 
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I argue that including violence within the obscenity exception to the First 
Aniendmenf9 is justified by an examination of the ordinary language concept 
of obscenity, by the legal history of obscenity law, and by the policy 
arguments that underlie the existence of the exception. Turning first to the 
ordinary language concept, the extension of the term is clearly broader than 
sex, reaching even such uses as a corporation making "obscene profits." A 
reasonable limiting construction that still includes violence is found in a . 
suggested derivation of the word as from "ab scaena" or "off the stage,',30 
referring to material that could not be presented onstage. Viewed from that 
perspective and over a long-term history, obscenity has included violence at 
least as regularly as it has included sex. The classical Greek theater prohibited 
the depiction of homicide on the stage.3l Although a killing that occurred 
offstage could be described on stage in great detail, it could not be shown.32 
While a character might die onstage of natural causes or be struck dead by the 
gods or commit suicide, visual depiction of homicide was barred.33 At the 
same time, there was a toleration in Greek theater of sexual dialogue and the 
onstage portrayal of sexual excitement and nudity.34 The theater of early 
Rome maintained these Greek values, and while later Roman theater allowed, 
and in fact reveled in, violence to the degree of actual killings, it also allowed 
the actual performance of sexual acts on stage.3S 
The relative treatments of sex and violence as obscenity varied over the 
centuries. In some eras prior to our own, theater was quite violent, with the 
Middle Age mystery plays serving as an example.36 Similarly, in some eras, 
entertainment was very sexual to the degree of animal, and even human, 
copulation being seen as fit for display.37 The important point is that, in the 
history of the theater, sex does not have any exclusive claim to the label 
"obscene." 
29. The obscenity exception was recognized in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957), and the test for obscenity is presented in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
30. Havelock Ellis is credited with this derivation. See, e.g., 2 JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE 
TOOTHER.s: lHEMoRALLIMITSOFCRIMINALLAW 117 (I 985) (citing HA VELOCKEws, ON LIFE 
AND SEX 175 (1947». 
31. See, e.g., Roy C. FLICKINGER, lHE GREEK lHEATER AND ITS DRAMA 130 (4th ed. 
1936); PETER D. ARNOTT, AN INTRODUCTION TO TIlE GREEK lHEAlRE 22 (1959). 
32. See FLICKINGER, supra note 31, at 131. 
33. See id. 
34. See, e.g., ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA (Robert Henning Webb trans., 1963). 
35. See RICHARD C. BEACHAM, lHE ROMAN lHEAlRE AND ITS AUDIENCE 136-37 
(1991). 
36. See, e.g., John S. Gatton, There Must Be Blood: Mutilation and Martyrdom on the 
Medieval Stage, in VIOLENCE IN DRAMA 79 (James Redmond ed., 1991). 
37. See EBERHARD & PHYLLIS KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND TIlE LAW: THE 
PSYCHOLOGy OF EROTIC REALIsM AND PORNOGRAPHY 66-67 (1964). 
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Ordinary language can only take us so far, and what is of real historical 
importance to the law is the legal view of obscenity in the constitutionally 
relevant past. When the Supreme Court recognized the obscenity exception, 
it cited to a long history of statutes and cases dating back to the constitutional 
era.38 What is important to note in that history is the lack of focus on sexuality 
in those statutes and cases. In Professor Frederick Schauer's analysis of the 
history of obscenity law, 39 he concludes that an English defmition of obscenity 
limited to sex did not develop until the 1868 case of Regina v. Hicklin.40 In 
American law the focus on sex emerged only in the 1896 Supreme Court 
decision in Swearingen v. United States.41 The limitation of obscenity to sex 
is the creation of the Victorian era's obsessive concerns over sex. This late 
1800s, post-fourteenth amendment focus is then the product of a 
constitutionally irrelevant period. If the law in the constitutional era and in 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment left obscene material unprotected, as 
the Court concluded, it should be what was obscene in that era, not the post-
Victorian era, that is without first amendment protection. 
It is also interesting to note that the late 1800s limitation on the use of 
the word "obscene" was not accompanied by a change in the desire to regulate 
other depictions that would formerly have been labeled "obscene." The New 
York organization established by the anti-obscenity crusader Anthony 
Comstock also led the effort to prohibit the distribution of "any book, 
pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the 
publication, or principally made up of criminal news, police reports or 
accounts of criminal deeds or pictures and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust 
or crime.'>42 While this was the statute Winters found unconstitutionally 
vague, it reflected a concern shared by a majority of the states at the time, as 
shown by nineteen nearly identical and four substantially similar statutes.43 
The history of nonprotection for violent material is then, up until the most 
recent era, as long as that for sexual material, and if legal history justifies the 
obscenity exception, it justifies an exception that reaches violence as well as 
sex. 
It is also important to examine briefly the policies said to justify the First 
Amendment and its obscenity exception. If the amendment protected only 
political speech or speech advocating social change, the exception both with 
regard to sex and to violence would be justified, since material with serious 
38. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 482-83. 
39. See FREDERICKF. SCHAUER, lHE LAW OF OBSCENlTY 7 (1976). 
40. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868). 
41. 161 U.S. 446 (1896). 
42. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 380 (1884). See a/so N.Y. PENAL LAW ~ 692 (1887). 
43. See Winters, 333 U.S. at 522-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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value cannot be considered obscene.44 Professor Schauer's "Free Speech 
Principle" is broader but still requires communication, and he justifies placing 
the hardest core pornography in the obscenity exception because he sees it as 
noncommunicative, as nonspeech, and as no more worthy of first amendment 
protection than would be a mechanical sex aid.4s His objection to protecting 
sexually obscene materials appears to be that the brain is not their real 
audience.46 They have a visceral, rather than a cognitive or emotional, 
response.47 Music and romantic literature may stimulate, but they do so 
through the higher order functions of the brain; the brain is at least a co-equal 
audience.48 His view that the brain is a superior audience to the genitals seems 
reasonable. However, the brain would also seem to be a superior audience to 
the adrenals, and there seems to be no reason to prefer one portion of the 
endocrine system over the other. If depictions are violent enough to have a 
hormonal effect, Schauer's arguments would seem also to exclude them from 
the protection of the First Amendment. 
While there are first amendment theories that speak against the existence 
of any obscenity exception, as long as the obscenity exception is a part of the 
law, the interesting theories are those that justify it. Each of those theories 
also justifies an exception for violent obscenity.49 Given the legal history, the 
ordinary language concept, and the inability to distinguish the two under first 
amendment theory, the law should allow a refocusing of the obscenity 
exception to include violence. That recognition of violent obscenity should 
be accompanied by a further recognition that violent material may also be 
indecent. As such, it may already come within the authority of the FCC to 
channel it in hours when children are less likely to be in the audience. 
Congress can answer any statutory concerns through a bill such as that 
introduced by Senator Hollings,SO and the courts should uphold the practice 
through the same analysis as was employed in Pacifica.s, 
The second issue, the extension of the FCC channeling approach to cable 
programming, is more difficult. It raises all the issues already discussed but 
also raises separate issues with regard to the standards to be applied to cable 
as distinct from the broadcast media. While the broadcast media have 
44. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
45. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, fREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY ch. 12 (1982). 
46. Seeid. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. For an examination of other policy bases for the obscenity exception and their 
application to violence see SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: LIMITING TIm MEolA's FIRsT 
AMENDMENTPRoTECfIoN,supra note 25, at 135-60. 
50. See S. 341, 107th Congo (2001). 
51. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734-51. 
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regularly been held subject to a variety of governmental regulations, cable has 
enjoyed stronger first amendment protection. The most recent example of that 
stronger protection, and one particularly relevant to the subject here, is found 
in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. 52 The issue there was 
an attempt to prevent signal bleed on cable channels primarily devoted to 
sexually oriented programming. 53 Programmers were required either to 
scramble fully their offerings, to shield children from exposure to the distorted 
but discernable images and the audio that accompanies those images on less 
fully scrambled channels, or to limit their sexually oriented programming to 
the hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.54 The costs of full scrambling led Playboy to 
choose the second alternative, but that resulted in a loss of income compared 
to what would be obtained from twenty-four hour programming.55 
When Playboy's challenge to the statutory requirements reached the 
Supreme Court, the provisions were not well received. Even though the 
channeling requirement clearly would have been constitutional in the context 
of broadcasting, extension to cable was held to be a violation of the First 
Amendment. 56 The Court recognized the restriction as content based and held 
that the limitations had to meet strict scrutiny; they had to be necessary to, or 
narrowly tailored to, a compelling governmental interest. 57 The Court did not 
dispute the position that the shielding of children from sexually indecent 
material was such a compelling interest but said that, if there was a less 
restrictive means of reaching the government's goal, the full scrambling or 
channeling choice could not be imposed.58 That less restrictive means was 
available in another provision of the federal statutes and speaks to one of the 
reasons for distinguishing cable from broadcast. Just as cable is invited into 
the home, often on a channel by channel or tier by tier of service basis, 
broadcast is available to anyone with a television or radio. However, cable 
can be blocked on a channel by channel basis. In fact, federal law requires 
cable providers to block or scramble fully any channel the subscriber does not 
wish to receive. 59 This alternative provides protection for children whose 
parents wish that protection, without imposing scrambling costs on the 
programmer or restricting the hours of its programming. The lesson here, and 
one that can be found throughout first amendment law, is that attempts to 
52. 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
53. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc:, 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000). 
54. See Playboy En/m't, 529 U.S. at 808. 
55. See id. at 809. 
56. See id. at 811-12. 
57. See id. at 812-13. 
58. See id. at 813-23. 
59. See id. at 809-10 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1994 & Supp. III 1997». 
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protect children will be struck down if there is an alternative that is less 
burdensome on adult communication. 
Senator Hollings' bill takes an interesting approach to the least 
restrictive means problem. The bill instructs the FCC to assess the 
effectiveness of rating and encoding programs for the purpose of allowing the 
V -chip to provide a screening device for violent programming, in cable as well 
as broadcast, and only calls for channeling if the Commission concludes that 
the rating system is inadequate.6o By calling for an assessment of what would 
seem to be the only available alternative, the bill at least attempts to require 
that channeling be imposed only if it is the least restrictive alternative.61 
The courts will not be reticent to consider other alternatives that might 
be less restrictive than channeling, and it is possible that the cable industry 
will avoid the imposition of channeling, even if the rating and encoding is 
found inadequate. But, lacking a less restrictive alternative, the industry may 
be forced to choose between an adequate rating and encoding system and time 
channeling. 
Without a third alternative, the forced choice should be constitutional. 
The Court in Playboy Entertainment seemingly was willing to allow the time 
restrictions on Playboy's cable channel if there had been no less restrictive 
alternative.62 The Court certainly recognized the importance of the 
government interest involved.63 Here, of course, the interest is the shielding 
of children from violent material, rather than sexual indecency. If the interest 
recognized in shielding from sexual indecency must be tied to the concept of 
obscenity, then as argued above, the inclusion of violence in the obscenity 
exception should carry over to cable and provide as compelling a government 
interest in this context as well. 
If the interest that would, absent a less restrictive alternative, justify the 
restrictions on cable indecency is instead based on demonstrated actual harm 
to minors, the evidence is far stronger for the analogous interest in shielding 
children from violent depictions. There is little evidence of physical and 
psychological harm growing out of the exposure of children to indecency, 
perhaps due primarily to ethical concerns over exposing test samples of 
children to such material. There is, however, strong evidence of negative 
physical and psychological effects growing out of exposure to media violence. 
There is now a vast body of research, and the aggregate of that social 
science and psychological research clearly demonstrates a connection between 
media violence generally and real world violence. Six major professional 
60. See S. 341, 107th Congo §§ 3(a)(I), 5 (2001). 
61. See id. at § 2(15). 
62. See Playbay Entm't, 529 U.S. at 813-23. 
63. See id. 
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organizations in the health field have found the science conclusive.64 In a joint 
statement, issued in July 2000, the American Psychological Association, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Medical Association, the American 
Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Psychiatric Association 
concluded that ''well over 1,000 studies ... point overwhelmingly to a causal 
connection between media violence and aggressive behavior in some 
children. ,,(;5 While some in the entertainment industry may still dispute the 
connection, as tobacco executives continued to dispute the detrimental health 
effects of cigarettes, the scientific community has come to its conclusion. 
The government interest, then, is at least as strong in shielding children 
from violent material as it is in shielding them from sexual indecency. That 
interest, as shown by the Playboy Entertainment case,66 is strong enough to 
require channeling, even on cable, if there is no less restrictive alternative. 
The V -chip would seem to be that alternative, but only if the industry 
implements it in a manner that allows it to do the job originally envisioned for 
the chip. If the FCC fmds that the age-based approach is inadequate, a 
content-based approach is not forthcoming, and a third less restrictive 
approach is not recognized, time channeling should also be imposed on cable 
programming. 
64. See American Academy of Pediatrics et aI., Joint Statement on the Impact of 
Entertainment Violence on Children, Statement to the Congressional Public Health Summit 
(July 26, 2000), at http://www.aap.orgladvocacy/releasesljstmtevc.htm. 
65. [d. 
66. See Playboy Entm't, 529 U.S. at 813-23. 
